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Intergroup Conflict in Lebanon: Social Identification and Involvement in Collective
Action Predict More Hopelessness for Lebanese Young Adults
Nassim Tabri
The studies examined social identity, collective action, and individual hopelessness in
young adults who were university students living through the severe escalating intergroup
conflict in Lebanon in 2007 and 2008. As expected, participants in Study 1 (N = 162)
viewed the conflict as escalating, potentially leading to a civil war, and as leading to
hopelessness. Studies 2 and 3 applied social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986)
to address the determinants and consequences of social identification and involvement in
collective action. As well, a hypothesis was derived from Staw's (1997) escalation of
commitment theory. Structural equation modeling was conducted. As expected,
participants in Study 2 (N = 566) who perceived the intergroup hierarchy as unstable,
illegitimate, and group boundaries as impermeable (i.e., migration between groups is not
possible) identified more with their group and were more involved in collective action.
As well, social identification and collective action increased individual hopelessness.
Perceiving the hierarchy as unstable was also directly linked to less hopelessness. Study 3
(N = 278) was a modified replication which focused on perceived instability and social
identity as determinants ofhopelessness and depression. Parallel effects emerged, and
hopelessness was linked to depression. As well, not only did social identification in Study
3 increase depression via hopelessness, but identification unexpectedly also directly
decreased depression. Across both studies, perceived instability both increased and
decreased hopelessness, via different pathways. The findings reveal complex pathways
iv
by which social identity processes influence adjustment. Implications are discussed for
SIT and the broader context of Lebanon.
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1Introduction
The present research applied social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986)
to the severe and escalating intergroup conflict in Lebanon in 2007 and 2008. The
research addressed the determinants of social identification with one's group and
involvement in collective action for Lebanese young adults. We also examined whether
young adults who identify with their group and are involved in collective action to
support their group experience more hopelessness for their futures in a context of severe
and escalating intergroup conflict. This hypothesis was derived from Staw's (1997)
escalation of commitment theory.
In Chapter 1, 1 provide a general overview of intergroup relations in Lebanon. I
also elaborate on the consociational power-sharing arrangement between the different
groups and how it was rearranged after the Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to
1990. Correspondingly, I elaborate on events from the conclusion of the civil war which
have led to the onset of the political crisis in 2006. It is important to note that foreign
interference played a significant role in the Lebanon's history and the political crisis
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influences of foreign interference in Lebanon goes beyond the scope of the present
research. The aim ofthe present research was to examine the intergroup conflict in
Lebanon by focusing on the psychology of the individual. As such, the role of foreign
interference will not be discussed in great detail (interested readers can see Khalaf, 2002,
for an in-depth analysis on the role of foreign interference in Lebanon).
Following the sections on Lebanon, I briefly describe social identity theory in aim
to orient the reader with the theoretical framework used in the present research. In
2Chapter 2, 1 present the manuscript-based version of the thesis. In this Chapter, I present
the introduction, Studies 1, 2, and 3, and their related discussions, along with a general
discussion of the findings. In the general discussion, I briefly expand upen the results in
terms of their implication for Lebanese young adults and the broader context of Lebanon.
Intergroup Relations in Lebanon: An Overview
Lebanon's society is heterogeneous. It is composed of several religious minorities
that are geographically segregated and organized along political lines. The different
religious groups or sects operate in a social order without a majority group (Salibi, 1988;
Hourani, 1954). There are over 27 religious sects of which 1 8 are recognized by the
Lebanese state. Only 6 of the recognized groups play a major role in government and
politics. Specifically, 3 ofthese groups are Christian, whereas the other 3 are Muslim.
The Christian groups concerned are the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic
sects whereas the Muslim groups concerned are the Sunni, Shiite, and Druze sects.
Historically, the different religious groups were vehemently distrustful of each other and
relied on foreign assistance and support to safeguard their communities (Makdisi, 2000;
o~i.ru: moo\oauui, ijoo).
The different religious groups operate politically within the framework of a
consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969). Consociational democracies involve the
establishment of a power-sharing arrangement for heterogeneous societies to coexist with
the aim oftransforming them into stable democracies. Consociationalism consists of four
pillars: a grand coalition, proportional representation, mutual veto, and autonomy for
each community. Specifically, the elites of each community represent their communities
within the framework of a grand coalition in government that emphasizes co-operation.
3The representation of the groups in government is based on proportionality (i.e., the
numerical size of each group), whereas the rights and interests of each community are
protected with a mutual veto in government. Finally, the consociational power-sharing
democracy grants each group a high degree of autonomy in running their own affairs,
such as education. Other goals of consociationalism involve government stability,
survival of democracy, and the avoidance ofviolence, where each of these goals is
contingent on the endurance of the power-sharing arrangement between the different
groups.
In line with consociationalism, the political elites representing their religious
communities mediated the relationship between the citizen and the state. A Lebanese
citizen, by law, has to belong to one of the recognized religious groups in order to vote
and this information is indicated in government registries (Salibi, 1988). However, the
political elites behave more like supreme leaders or patrons of their religious
communities with the aim of increasing their influence and power, as opposed to heads of
state with the aim ofworking collectively for the greater good of the country (Deneoux,
1993). For example, all national or state projects, such as building roads, linking
electricity and telephones, dispensing ofjobs... etc. were a function of the political elites
who exclusively improved their regions and electorates, which were composed of
members from their religious group. In consequence, Lebanese citizens developed a
dependence on their elites for services by becoming their clients. For example, Lebanese
individuals would seek out their political leaders or patrons to interfere on their behalf
when carrying out a government transaction or when applying for a job. In return, they
would owe their political leaders undisputed political allegiance.
In addition, belonging to one's religious group has financial benefits. Previous
research indicates that many university students receive financial support from
institutions and charitable organizations which were developed by their religious group
for its members (El-Amine & Faour, 1998). For example, the Hariri Foundation was
developed to assist needy Sunni students enrolled at institutions of higher education. In
sum, many Lebanese individuals became attached to, and identified with, a traditional
leader and their religious group. Previous research indicates that members of the different
religious groups are strongly attached to, and prefer political leaders from, their own
religious group (Faour 1998; Haddad, 2001; Khashan, 1990).
As mentioned above, religious group affiliation is an important political structure
in Lebanon. Religious group affiliation is also an important social structure of Lebanese
society since it is a primary source of social differentiation (Starr, 1978). Specifically,
Lebanon's geography is divided along sectarian lines. That is, members of a religious
group exclusively occupy entire regions in Lebanon or entire neighborhoods in a city. As
such, Lebanese individuals can determine the religious background and political
affiliation of their compatriots by paying attention to several distinct features, such as the
way one is dressed, listening to one's Arabic accent, and knowing one's name and their
place of residence in Lebanon. Another example includes the religious paraphernalia
Lebanese individuals use to decorate their cars, such as stickers ofKoranic calligraphy,
pictures of saints, and emblems ofpolitical parties.
Furthermore, most enterprises in Lebanon, such as professional associations,
businesses, schools, hospitals, sport clubs, leisure centers, and charitable organizations
are organized along religious lines (Starr, 1 978). Involvement in these exclusive
5associations is also reflective of one's religious background or affiliation. Moreover,
political tensions between the different religious groups at the national level often
manifest in sporting events between the players of competing clubs that are affiliated
with the religious groups. In short, religious group affiliation is a salient feature of
Lebanese society, especially when there are political and social tensions, or conflict,
between the religious groups.
However, religious group affiliation has little to do with an individual's strength
ofbelief or spirituality. Instead, religious group affiliation regulates life in Lebanon. In
particular, all civil courts in Lebanon which deal with religious transactions, such as
marriage, divorce, and inheritance, are administered by each religious group for its
members. Like government transactions, religious transactions are facilitated by the
political leaders for members of their religious group.
Consequently, a lack of adherence to the political leader or patron of one's
religious group in Lebanon may lead to problems and difficulties when carrying out
essential religious and government transactions, or when seeking protection in times of
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Lebanon may lead individuals to be involved with secular political parties, such as the
Lebanese Communist Party or the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Yet, these secular
parties do not have much political power compared to the political parties associated with
the various religious groups. Furthermore, secular parties do not have a central role in
Lebanon and are on the fringes of the political system. In sum, religious group affiliation
plays a profound and pervasive role in the daily lives of the Lebanese. Specifically,
6religious group affiliation is a fundamental socio-political structure of Lebanese society
that provides individuals with a sense of identification, security, advantage, and intimacy.
Consociational Agreements: The National Pact and TaifAccord
An important consociational agreement between the religious groups was the
National Pact, which dates back to 1 943 when Lebanon achieved independence from
France (Trabulsi, 2007). The agreement centered on the Maronite and Sunni communities
of Lebanon. Specifically, the National Pact stipulated that the Maronite community
would trade Western protection for political supremacy guaranteed by the constitution,
whereas the Sunni community would drop the idea of aligning Lebanon with Syria (or
any other Arab unions) in return for Muslim partnership in running the affairs of
Lebanon. Historically, the Maronite community of Mount-Lebanon perceived themselves
as an endangered Christian minority threatened by a dominant Muslim majority that
surrounded them in neighboring lands, whereas the Sunni communities in the coastal
cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon desired union with Syria (Salibi, 1988). As such, the
National Pact attempted to allay Maronite fears ofbeing engulfed by the Muslim
^uiiimuixi Ut/ö olivi. t\j maintain iviu-oimi pai uici 0111p in ¿uxiiixiig uiv unauo vsj. iwuuiivu.
The National Pact also distributed power, jobs, benefits, and services between the
religious groups at all levels of government, which was based on a population census
conducted in 1932. Specifically, political power was distributed using a 6/5 ratio in favor
of Christian representation in parliament, cabinet, and other governmental bodies. The
census did not reflect the demographic reality of the time, yet the Muslim communities
viewed the uneven distribution ofpower as a concession to allay Maronite fears (Khalaf,
2002).
7In addition, the three major positions in government were also distributed between
the religious groups. The post of President was given to the Maronites, whereas the post
ofPrime Minister was given to the Sunnis and the post of House or Parliament Speaker
was given to the Shiites. The National Pact and constitution also granted the Maronite
President ultimate executive authority that trumped those of the Sunni Prime Minister and
the Shiite House Speaker, while not providing a mechanism for presidential
accountability. The remaining groups did not receive a considerable share of power due
to their relatively small demographic size. However, these relatively small groups were
also represented in parliament and the government cabinet.
The power-sharing arrangement dictated by the National Pact collapsed in 1975
(Salibi, 1988; Trabulsi, 2007). Specifically, the dominating Maronite political elites
alienated the traditional Muslim leadership by electing nontraditional and weak Muslim
leaders to serve as Prime Minister and House Speaker. In addition, the Maronite political
elites were unwilling to share or give more political power to the Muslim communities.
The unbalanced distribution ofpower that favored the Christians, especially Maronites,
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the Palestine Liberation Organization and Syria's army in Lebanon, exacerbated tensions
between the different religious groups and led to a protracted and violent civil war. The
war began in 1975 and ended in 1990.
The Taif Accord brought an end to the civil (Trabulsi, 2007). It redistributed
power using a 5/5 ratio in parliament and reduced the prerogatives of the Maronite
President in favor of the Sunni Prime Minister and the government cabinet, and the Shiite
House Speaker. In other words, the TaifAccord shifted power away from the Maronite
8community and increased the power of the Sunni and Shiite communities despite using
an even distribution of seats in parliament. It also legalized the Syrian armed presence in
Lebanon as a mandatory power to maintain security in a post-war society. Furthermore,
the Taif accord also called for the secularization of Lebanon as a national priority.
However, as mentioned above, the Taif Accord merely reproduced the consociational
power-sharing arrangement without instituting any reforms or a mechanism to move the
country towards secularism. Moreover, none of the Lebanese governments since the Taif
Accord have taken concrete steps to reduce the influence of the religious groups in
politics, government, and the civil courts.
Intergroup Conflict in Lebanon from 2006 to 2008
The seeds of the political conflict in Lebanon from 2006 to 2008 can be traced
back to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafie El Hariri on the 14th ofFebruary
2005. His assassination forced Syria to withdraw its army from Lebanon in April 2005
after 29 years ofpresence. Prior to Hariri's assassination, Syria played a decisive role in
the social and political affairs ofpost-war Lebanon. First, it disarmed the Palestinian
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formally recognized as the national resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon (Trabulsi, 2007). Second, Syria's armed presence in Lebanon gave it a
monopoly over security, which allowed it to manipulate the outcome of Lebanese
politics. Specifically, Syria insured the election ofpro-Syrian candidates from the various
religious communities at all levels ofgovernment. As a result, Syria controlled Lebanon's
domestic and foreign policies.
9The first general elections in post-war Lebanon designated Rafie El Hariri as
Prime Minister. Hariri served as Prime Minister until 1998 and again in 2000 until his
resignation in October 2004. In the post-war period, the Maronite traditional leadership
and their Christian supporters boycotted the general elections to signal their discontent at
Syria's meddling in Lebanon's political affairs and their rejection of the new power-
sharing formula embodied in the Taif Accord, which favored the Muslim communities.
However, less influential Maronite leaders went against the Maronite rank and file by
serving in pro-Syrian governments (El Khazen, 1 994).
Since the end of the civil war, the Christian anti-Syrian movement was dominated
by the Maronite community and was supported by other Christian communities. They
voiced their opposition to Syria's military presence and strong involvement in Lebanon's
domestic affairs. Specifically, the political organizations representing the Christian
communities of Lebanon, such as the moderate Free Patriotic Movement of former
General Michel Aoun and the right-wing Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea, engaged in
demonstrations and public protests to contest Syria's role and presence in Lebanon.
However, their efforts were víoieníiy represseu uy tue LcLFôncse army anu intelligence
service at the behest of Syria and their pro-Syrian Lebanese allies who controlled the
country. For example, members of the Christian anti-Syrian movement were imprisoned,
assaulted, and kidnapped by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services, including the
Lebanese army (e.g., Agents Round Up protesters", 2001; "Arrests are 'Illegal and
Unconstitutional'", 2001; "Crackdown Continues", 2001; "Murr Touts Specter of Coup
to Defend Heavy-Handedness", 200 1 )
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Nevertheless, on the international level, the Christian anti-Syrian movement was
instrumental in the adoption of the Syrian Accountability Act & Lebanon Sovereignty
Restoration Act in the US congress in 2003. The Syrian Accountability Act & Lebanon
Sovereignty Restoration Act applied pressure on Syria to withdraw its army and
intelligence apparatus from Lebanon by imposing economic sanctions. Correspondingly,
in September 2004, the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1559, which called for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, namely Hezbollah, and
the expulsion of foreign forces from Lebanon, namely Syria. In addition, UNSCR 1559
called for free and fair elections in Lebanon (International Crisis Group, 2005).
In 2004, Prime Minister Hariri fell out of favor with Syria when he opposed the
forced extension ofpro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud's term. Furthermore, President
Lahoud clashed with Prime Minister Hariri and his cabinet on a number of issues related
to the handling of Lebanon's spiraling national debt, its economic programs, and the
privatization ofpublic enterprises (e.g., "Lahoud-Hariri Power Clash Shifts to Economic
Focus", 2004). These events led Prime Minister Hariri to resign along with his cabinet.
Í1S iuivi jv/nivu uiv ^miuiiiuii tviill-ujiítuí U|^/UÖ1UV/11 VYIlVIl UlV HV ti IJ vivvivu j/iu-ujliuii
government introduced an electoral bill that would ensure his failure in the upcoming
elections in the spring of 2005. In addition, other traditional leaders from different
religious communities who once favored Syria, such as Walid Jumblat from the Druze
community, also joined the anti-Syrian opposition. The new electoral bill crystallized the
anti-Syrian opposition, which now included Muslim and Christian groups. In response to
the electoral bill, the anti-Syrian opposition drafted the "Bristol Declaration", which
called for Lebanon's right to self-determination and the desire to live in peace with Syria,
11
with mutual respect for each other's sovereignty. The declaration was ratified by
opposition members and former Prime Minister Hariri emerged as its leader in January
2005 (International Crisis Group, 2005).
On the 14th of February 2005, former Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated in
Beirut. His assassination led to a massive demonstration by the followers and supporters
of the anti-Syrian opposition in Lebanon. They demanded an international investigation
into the assassination and the implementation of UNSCR 1559, which called on Syria to
withdraw its army from Lebanon and for Hezbollah to disarm. Their consistent mass
demonstrations led to the resignation of the pro-Syrian government and the institution of
a caretaker government that would oversee the next general elections.
However, the Shiite community and their socio-political organizations, namely
Hezbollah, were not involved in the anti-Syrian demonstrations nor were they aligned
with the anti-Syrian movement. Hezbollah's lack of involvement increased tensions
between the religious communities. In short, Hezbollah viewed the anti-Syrian mass
mobilizations as threatening their power, since they demanded the full implementation of
UNSCR 1559, which indirectly called on Hezbollah to disarm. In reaction, the Shiite
community and their pro-Syrian allies mounted a counter-demonstration on the 8th of
March 2005 to reveal numerical superiority and to "thank" Syria for its role in
maintaining stability and calm in Lebanon during the post-war period. In reaction to the
Shiite community's demonstrations, the anti-Syrian movement launched a massive
counter-demonstration on the 14th ofMarch 2005 in attempt to reveal numerical
superiority over the Shiite community and their allies. This massive uprising became
known as the Cedar Revolution (International Crisis Group, 2005). In sum, both
12
demonstrations drew hundreds of thousands of supporters on separate occasions and the
polarized movements became known as the "March 8" and "March 1 4" movements.
After Hariri's assassination and the withdrawal of Syria's army from Lebanon, the
country witnessed its first free general elections since the end of the civil war. The 2005
elections were significant because it involved, for the first time since the Taif Accord,
major Christian participation in the elections. Most notable were the involvement of
former General Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement and the right-wing Lebanese
Forces who campaigned in the past against Syria's involvement in Lebanon. The results
revealed that the Free Patriotic Movement and Lebanese forces won most of their
electoral ridings. The results also affirmed that Saed El Hariri, the son of slain former
Prime Minister Rafie El Hariri, was the undisputed leader of the Sunni community in
Lebanon (Ajami, 2005). In short, the March 14 movement had a sweeping victory and
was now in control of the Lebanese government.
However, the March 14 movement headed by Saed El Hariri attempted to
marginalize the role of former General Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement in
government. In response, the Free Patriotic Movement formed an alliance with Hezbollah
and other leaders from the Sunni and Druze communities who were part of March 8
opposition. This maneuver challenged the March 14 government because former General
Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement was the largest and most popular Christian
party in Lebanon. However, some traditional, but less influential, Maronite leaders
continued to support the March 14 government, such as Samir Geagea's right-wing
Lebanese Forces party and Amin Gemayel's Phalangist Party.
13
As such, the March 8 opposition was comprised ofmembers from the Christian,
Shiite, and Druze communities, with little support from the Sunni community, whereas,
the March 14 movement was comprised of members from the Christian, Sunni, and
Druze communities, with very little support from the Shiite community. In terms of a
sectarian split, the widest was between the Shiite and Sunni communities, whereas the
Christians and Druze fell on both sides of the political divide. On the one hand, the
March 14 movement was backed by major Western powers, such as the US, which
sought to increase their influence in Lebanon, to pressure Syria, and to disarm Hezbollah.
On the other hand, the March 8 opposition movement had a tacit alliance with Syria and
Iran, and sought to limit American influence in Lebanon. In short, the March 14 and
March 8 coalitions had irreconcilable visions for Lebanon. This conflict was described as
"one Lebanon against another" (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 1).
The political elites representing the different religious groups on both sides of the
political divide engaged in a national dialogue to quell their differences on certain points
ofdisagreement. These points included the distribution ofpower in government,
disarmament of Hezbollah, Lebanon's relationship with Syria, the election of a consensus
President after the expiration ofpro-Syrian President Lahoud's term in November 2007,
and the United Nations investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister
Hariri (e.g., Bakri & Hatoum, 2006; Hatoum, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2006;
Qawas, 2006).
The national dialogue was a failure, since the rival movements were unable to
achieve consensus on any of the abovementioned points. In particular, the March 14
government was unwilling to share power with the March 8 opposition. That is, they
14
refused to grant the March 8 opposition a third of the seats in the government cabinet
which would enable them to have a mutual veto over government decisions. Moreover,
the March 14 government was not ready to put in place a good national defense strategy
that would protect Lebanon's sovereignty from any future Israeli aggressions if
Hezbollah were to disarm. Following this discord, Israel and Hezbollah entered a
destructive war that devastated and crippled Lebanon in the summer of 2006.
In the aftermath of the Israel-Hezbollah summer war, tensions increased between
the March 14 government and the March 8 opposition. Specifically, the opposing groups
were still unable to achieve consensus on any of the abovementioned points. In particular,
the March 14 government argued that Hezbollah's armed status endangered Lebanon
because it feeds into Israel's sense of insecurity and challenged the right of the
government to unilaterally decide when to go to war. However, Hezbollah was still
unwilling to disarm because Israel still occupied part of Lebanon and the government was
unable to put in place a good national defense strategy. Most importantly, the opposing
groups were unable to reach an agreement over the distribution ofpower in government
(International Crisis Group, 2006).
However, the March 8 opposition continued to press the March 14 government to
grant them the minimum number of seats in the government cabinet necessary for them to
have a mutual veto. From the perspective of the March 14 government, the mutual veto
would give Hezbollah political guarantees against disarmament and enable the March 8
opposition to bring down the March 14 government at their discretion. As such, the
March 14 government categorically refused to share power with the March 8 opposition.
In response, the March 8 opposition sought to pressure the March 14 government. First,
15
they withdrew all their cabinet ministers from government. This strategy deemed the
government unconstitutional, since the Shiite community was no longer participating in
government within the frameworks of consociationalism and the Lebanese constitution.
Second, the March 8 opposition took to the streets in attempt to bring down the
March 14 government and initiate early parliamentary elections ("Nasrallah: Be
'Psychologically' Ready for Mass Street Protests", 2006; "Nasrallah Pledges 'Very Big
Action' Soon Against Government", 2007). These events led to mass demonstrations and
counter-demonstrations by the supporters of the March 8 and March 14 movements
which, in some cases, have ended in violent clashes (e.g., Austin, 2006; Bakri, 2006;
Ghazal, 2006; Ghazal, 2007; Samaha 2006a; Samaha, 2006c). Furthermore, the March 8
opposition instituted a sit-in protest involving several thousand supporters at the office of
the Prime Minister in December of 2006. The sit-in protest would last until May 2008.
The actions of the March 8 opposition paralyzed the March 14 government and
country. Their actions also blocked the March 14 government from electing a new
President after the term ofPresident Lahoud expired in November 2007. In fact, the
election of a new President was postponed over 10 times. As such, the March 14
government was unable to govern the country without, let alone against, the March 8
opposition. This situation worsened the political impasse and intensified the public
demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, which frequently turned violent. In short, the
conflict was being waged in the streets using mass mobilizations, as opposed to being
resolved through formal dialogue. In fact, the lack of extensive dialogue between the
government and opposition coalitions and the use of demonstrations has contributed to
the escalation in violence (International Crisis Group, 2007).
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The violence was predominantly between the Shiite supporters of the March 8
opposition and the Sunni supporters of the March 14 government. For example, there
were violent clashes in mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods between residents who
supported either the government or opposition movements. There were also intra-
Christian (Samaha, 2006a) and intra-Druze clashes ("Two Wounded in Clashes Between
Rival Druze Parties", 2008) between the supporters of the March 8 opposition and March
14 government. In short, the clashes between the supporters of the March 8 and March 14
movements were sectarian, which increased tensions between all the religious
communities.
The numerous clashes and inter-communal tensions increased fears of a new civil
war in Lebanon. As the crisis worsened, many foreign and domestic interlocutors
attempted to put forward new formulas to re-arrange the power-sharing formula in
government to end the political logjam. However, their efforts were met with little
success, since neither of the opposing groups was willing to give up their demands on the
distribution ofpower in government. As such, the March 14 government and March 8
opposition forces have been unable to achieve political dominance. News reports in 2007,
and 2008 indicated that the political discourse in Lebanon became more radicalized and
increased tensions and violence amongst the supporters of the competing groups. The
increase in violence diminished any hope for resolving the power struggle and revived
fears of a new civil war (e.g., "Lebanon Heads Into 2008 with Little Hope", 2007;
"Lebanon's New Civil War Recipe", 2008; "Political Crisis No End In Sight", 2008;
"Clashes In Beirut", 2008; "Hariri's Murder Anniversary Seen Pushing Lebanon to Brink
of Strife", 2008).
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In May 2008, the March 14 government attempted to crackdown on Hezbollah's
private telecommunication network, which is a key part of their military apparatus. The
March 14 government also attempted to marginalize the role of a Shiite general in the
Lebanese Armed Forces. Hezbollah interpreted the government crackdown on its
telecommunications network as a declaration of war. As such, Hezbollah and their March
8 allies engaged in a take over of West Beirut, which is a Sunni area of Beirut and March
14 stronghold. Their aim was to disarm the supporters of the March 14 movement.
These actions escalated the power struggle into open and armed combat between
pro-government supporters and the supporters of the opposition (International Crisis
Group, 2008a). The armed combat bore a direct resemblance to events from the 1975-
1990 Lebanese civil war. For example, Beirut Internal Airport and major roads were
forcibly closed by protestors. In addition, there were violent battles between gunmen
from the opposing camps in residential and commercial areas all over Lebanon, in which
more than 40 people perished (Abdullah, 2008a; Abdullah, 2008b; Abdullah, 2008c;
Elghossein, 2008a).
The significant escalation in violence forced the leaders of the opposing camps to
reach a compromise over the distribution ofpower in the government cabinet, which
would last until the next general elections in 2009. This agreement became known as the
Doha Accord and led to the election of a new Maronite President after a 6 month
vacuum. The Doha Accord formula granted the March 8 opposition a mutual veto in
government and increased the prerogatives of the newly elected President. However, the
opposing groups have had difficulty in implementing the Doha Accord in its entirety and
violent sectarian clashes between supporters of the opposing groups continued to take
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place across Lebanon (e.g., Elghossein, 2008b; Elghossein, 2008c; "Three Dead As Rival
Gunmen Clash", 2008).
It is important to note that the Lebanese intergroup conflict is multi-layered. One
of the layers is political. As mentioned above, the conflict concerns two coalitions of
religious groups that each has a separate and competing vision for Lebanon. Another
layer is sectarian. As discussed above, the intergroup conflict concerned the distribution
of power in the government cabinet between the March 8 opposition and March 14
government. However, the conflict is also sectarian because representation in government
is based on one's religious sect. For example, the power-sharing formula embodied in the
Doha Accord empowered the Christian communities of Lebanon and returned some of
the prerogatives of the Maronite President (e.g., "Christians To Regain Their Rights",
2008; International Crisis Group, 2008b). Another example includes the Shiite
community's desire for more political power in the government cabinet to guard against
the disarmament of Hezbollah.
Furthermore, the clashes between the March 8 and March 14 movements were
also inter-communal. For example, Sunnis and Shiites living in mixed districts of
Lebanon engaged in open violence against one another. However, there were also intra-
communal clashes between the Christian supporters of the Free Patriotic Movement
allied to the March 8 movement and the Christian supporters of the Lebanese Forces
allied to March 14 movement (e.g., Samaha, 2006a). Other intra-communal clashes
involved the rival political parties of the Druze community ("Two Wounded in Clashes
Between Rival Druze Parties", 2008).
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In sum, the intergroup conflict in Lebanon is essentially a conflict over the
distribution ofpolitical power between the Sunni, Shiite, Druze, and Christian
communities of Lebanon. This power-struggle was also layered by competing and
irreconcilable visions for the future of the country. The lack of consensus and open
dialogue between the rival coalitions led to a protracted political crisis in which public
demonstrations and protests by the competing groups pushed the country to the brink of a
new civil war.
Social Identity Theory
Social identity refers to that "part of an individual's self-concept which derives
from his knowledge ofhis membership of a social group (or groups) together with the
value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). The
degree to which individuals identify with their group represents the importance or
internalizing of group membership in the self-concept. A core assumption of social
identity theory is that individuals are motivated to achieve or maintain a positive and
distinct social identity vis-à-vis relevant comparison groups.
According to social identity theory, intergroup behavior involves the processes of
social identification, social categorization, and social comparison. Tajfel and Turner
suggested that individuals compare their groups with other groups on valued dimensions,
such as power, wealth, and prestige, which establishes a representation of a status
hierarchy between the groups. In short, the status representation is the outcome of
intergroup comparisons, which confers positive (i.e., high status) or negative (i.e., low
status) social identity. Social identity theory is largely formulated in terms ofmembers of
a low status ingroup who compare to a high status outgroup.
20
Taj fei and Turner suggested that low status group members may engage in
identity maintenance strategies, which are classified as either being collective or
individual strategies. Collective strategies involve individuals' attempts at improving
their status by enhancing their group's status, whereas individual strategies involve
attempts at improving one's own status while leaving group status unchanged. Social
identity theory outlines 3 major strategies that members of low status groups may engage
in to enhance their social identity: (1) individual mobility (e.g., leaving the low status
ingroup to join the high status outgroup), (2) social creativity (e.g., finding new
dimensions to compare the low status ingroup with the high status outgroup), and (3)
social competition and action (i.e., collective action that directly challenges the high
status outgroup in aim to alter the intergroup hierarchy). The present research addressed
collective action.
Social identity theory states that the choice ofwhether collective or individual
strategies are adopted is determined by individuals' perceptions of the instability and
illegitimacy of group status differences, and the extent to which they believe they are able
to leave their group to join another one (i.e., impermeability of group boundaries). In
short, group members who perceive the intergroup hierarchy as unstable and illegitimate,
and group boundaries as impermeable, identify more with their group and in turn are
more involved in collective action to support their group.
The Present Research
The present research was conducted in Lebanon in 2007 and 2008. The aim was
to examine the determinants of social identification with one's religious group and
involvement in collective action to support one's religious group for young adults within
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the framework of social identity theory. We also examined whether individuals who
identify with their religious group and are involved in collective action experience more
hopelessness for their own futures in a context of severe and escalating intergroup
conflict. This hypothesis was derived from Staw's (1997) escalation of commitment
theory.
In Study 1, we canvassed Lebanese university students' perceptions of the
political conflict in their country. It was expected that university students would perceive
the intergroup conflict in their country as escalating, potentially leading to civil war, and
leading young adults to feel hopeless. In Study 2, we tested predictions from social
identity theory to the intergroup conflict in Lebanon. Specifically, individuals'
perceptions of the intergroup hierarchy and group boundaries were examined as
determinants of social identity and involvement in collective action. We also examined
whether individuals who identify more with their group and are more involved in
collective action to support their group feel more hopelessness for their own futures.
Study 3 was a modified replication of Study 2 in which we examined how social
identification and other social identity variables may be linked to hopelessness for one's
future and depression.
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"The differences between Lebanese have led them to the brink of suicide."
—Michel Sulieman, President of Lebanon (as cited in Abdallah, 2008d)
"To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world and to live without loyalties, the
protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity, and the comfort of
normality."
—Albert Hourani (1954, p. 64)
Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) provides a rich
framework with which to examine intergroup conflict over scarce resources - such as
political power- from the perspective of individual perceptions, identity, and action. The
present research applied SIT to the political upheaval in Lebanon during 2007 and 2008
(International Crisis Group, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a). We examined how people's
perceptions of the intergroup context led them to identify with their group and engage in
collective action to support their group. These perceptions were of the status of their
group, of the instability and illegitimacy of group status differences, and of the degree to
which individuals can leave their group to join another one (i.e., permeability). The
present research also addressed the hypothesis that in the context of severe and escalating
intergroup conflict found in Lebanon in this period, individuals who identify with their
group and who are involved in collective action experience hopelessness for their own
personal futures as well as depression.
Lebanese society consists ofmultiple religious groups that are politicized (Salibi,
1988; Trabulsi, 2007) and to which people identify (El Amine & Faour, 1998; Faour,
1998; Haddad, 2002; Khashan, 1992). Lebanon is a country of religious minorities in
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which no one group is in the majority, and in which there is a power-sharing agreement
between groups that defines power differences between groups (Trabulsi, 2007). In the
Lebanese crisis between 2006 and 2008, none of the groups or coalition of groups was
dominating the others. Events such as assassinations of political leaders and journalists
reflected the political crisis between the different religious groups over government
control. Furthermore, the supporters of the competing groups engaged in mass
demonstrations and counter-demonstrations to challenge one another, which in some
cases ended in violent clashes (Ghazal, 2006; Samaha, 2006a). News reports in 2007 and
2008 described the public political discourse as being more radicalized and as increasing
tensions between the competing groups; the increase in violence revived fears of a new
civil war ("Rival Camps 'Ready' For Confrontation", 2008).
The present research was conducted in 2007 and 2008 with young adults enrolled
at universities in and near Beirut, Lebanon. These individuals were not sheltered from the
intergroup conflict. To the contrary, Lebanese national politics played out on university
campuses in that student parties were aligned with national political parties. There were
significant tensions in student elections (Samaha, 2006b; Samaha & Azzi, 2006), violent
clashes between students ("Clashes at Rafik Hariri University Wound Two", 2008), and a
riot that began in a university cafeteria spread across Beirut in 2007 left 3 dead, 158
injured, and substantial property damage (Azzi & Ghazal, 2007). University students
were insecure about their futures (Chakmakjian, 2006) and desired emigrating because
they fear a new civil war (Hourani & Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007).
The political conflict in Lebanon from 2006 to 2008 has the key features of
escalation situations (Staw, 1976, 1997). The competing groups were unable to reach a
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compromise over the distribution ofpower in government, which led them to engage in
collective action to achieve political dominance. Initial efforts were unsuccessful and
generally worsened the situation. Nevertheless, the competing groups escalated their
levels of collective action, which saw a spiral of public demonstrations and counter-
demonstrations to reveal superiority and achieve political dominance (International Crisis
Group, 2007). This intensification led to violent and armed conflict between the
competing groups, a damaged economy, and brought the country to the brink of a new
civil war. Staw (1976, 1997) identified the features of this type of escalation of
commitment and it has been examined in previous research in terms of individual choices
and actions (see Staw, 1 997, for a review), group decision-making (e.g., Bazerman,
Giuliano, & Appleman, 1984; Kameda & Sugimori, 1993), and in organizational settings
(e.g., Ross & Staw, 1986; Ross & Staw, 1993).
According to Staw (1997), escalating situations involve several steps: an initial
investment of effort or money into a project, obtaining negative results after the initial
investment, and escalating commitment to the project by investing even more money or
effort despite evidence that it is clearly failing. An important determinant of escalation of
commitment is external binding or what Staw (1997) referred to as social identity. In his
theory, the degree individuals socially identify with a project or group determines their
level of commitment to a chosen course of action for that project or group, regardless of
its merits or faults. Ofparticular relevance to the current situation in Lebanon, social
identity as defined by SIT may facilitate commitment in escalating situations (Dietz-
Uhler, 1996; Haslam, Ryan, Postmes, Spears, Jetten, & Webley, 2006). In the latter
experimental studies, group members who identified with their group escalated their
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commitment over time to a losing course of action by investing more money into a failing
group project.
The first study that we conducted was a survey in which we assessed Lebanese
university students' perceptions of the political crisis in their country. The expectation
was that they would perceive the political crisis as an escalating situation; namely, they
would view the collective action by the competing groups as being ineffective and
worsening the situation in the country for everyone, and potentially leading the country to
a new civil war. The second and third studies applied SIT to understanding psychological
aspects of the political conflict in Lebanon. The aim of Studies 2 and 3 was to examine
the determinants and consequences of social identification and involvement in collective
action. Studies 2 and 3 addressed hypotheses regarding identity, hopelessness, and
depression, and these hypotheses were derived from, but were also distinct from Staw's
(1997) escalation of commitment theory. Studies 2 and 3 were not aimed at documenting
escalation of commitment over time. The escalation of conflict was nevertheless widely
documented in local Lebanese and international media at the time the studies were
conducted.
Hypothesis la, which is grounded in SIT, was that people who perceive status
differences as unstable and illegitimate, and who perceive group boundaries as
impermeable identify more with their group and, in turn, are more involved in collective
action. Status differences are perceived as unstable if individuals conceive possible
improvement in their groups' status position within the intergroup hierarchy. Status
differences are perceived as illegitimate if individuals believe their groups' status position
in the intergroup hierarchy is unfair or unjust. Group boundaries are perceived as
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impermeable if individuals believe that people are unable to leave one status group to join
another one. Hypothesis la has been very well supported in prior research (Brown, 2000;
for a recent exception, see Kessler & Mummendey, 2002). Research that has focused
exclusively on perceptions of impermeability also indicates that people who perceive
group boundaries as impermeable exhibit more identification, more collective action, or
more ofboth (e.g., Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Lalonde &
Silverman, 1994; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).
A key theme in SIT is how individuals construe the status hierarchy in which their
own group is located, and the particular location of their group vis-à-vis other groups.
Given the importance ofperceived status differences in SIT, such perceptions were
directly assessed in Studies 2 and 3, and we examined the extent to which these
perceptions were related to social identity. Specifically, individuals were asked to report
on their perceptions of the status of their own groups in Lebanese society, and we
examined the relation of these perceptions to their social identity. Hypothesis lb was that
people who perceive their group as higher in status identify more with their group. Such
perceptions were assessed on an individual by individual basis, and Hypothesis lb is
consistent with the findings ofprevious experimental research that indicate that
individuals assigned to high status groups identify more strongly with their groups
compared to individuals assigned to low status groups (see Ellemers, 1993 for a review).
The most novel aspect of the present research is that we examined how social
identification may be linked to individual hopelessness. Hypothesis 2a was that in a
context of severe escalating conflict, people who identify with their group and are
involved in collective action feel more hopeless for their own futures. The rationale here
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is that their involvement in collective action is part of a pattern of escalating commitment
to a losing course of action (i.e., moving toward civil war). Our assumption is that people
were aware of this deadlock in resolving the political crisis, even as they continued to
demonstrate in the streets. These demonstrations raised the risk of civil war, which led
people to feel insecure and more hopeless about their own futures (Hourani & Sensenig-
Dabbous, 2007). This assumption is addressed in Study 1 , in which we canvassed
Lebanese university students for their perceptions of the ongoing political crisis in
Lebanon, and on its psychological consequences for young Lebanese adults. We expected
that they would perceive the conflict as an escalating situation that potentially may lead
to a civil war, and which was leading young adults to feel hopeless about their own
futures. Indeed, such views were expressed in the local Lebanese media (e.g.,
Chakmakjian, 2006; "Lebanon On High Alert", 2008). News reports also indicated that
Lebanese civilians were purchasing large amounts of weapons (e.g., "More Lebanese
Arming Themselves", 2008).
The severe, escalating conflict in Lebanon was the setting for the present research,
and the particularity of this setting can explain the contrast between Hypothesis 2a and
research indicating that social identification decreases feelings ofhopelessness (Crocker,
Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994) and enhances psychological adjustment and well-
being (e.g., Goodman, 2003; Greenfield & Marks, 2007; Phinney, 1990; Schmitt, &
Branscombe, 2002). Hypothesis 2a also contrasts with prior research indicating that
collective action leads to a sense of empowerment and positive affect (Drury, Cocking,
Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 1999). One
should note that some research indicates that identity can be linked to more negative
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affect, but this is when highly identified individuals perceive discrimination against their
group (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003, Yoo & Lee, 2008). In the present research, perceived
discrimination was not considered as playing a key role in and of itself, and was
addressed in terms of the perceived illegitimacy of group status differences.
Another novel aspect of the present research is that we examined the hypothesis
(2b) that people who perceive more potential upward mobility for their group (i.e.,
instability) in the status hierarchy feel less individual hopelessness. Given that better
outcomes are expected for one's group, it follows that group members can also be
hopeful for their own individual outcomes. Hypothesis 2b would seem to hold in general,
not only in the particular context of severe intergroup conflict. Taking Hypotheses la, 2a,
and 2b together, people's perceptions of instability are expected to have two opposite
effects on individual hopelessness in a context of severe intergroup conflict. On the one
hand, people who perceive more instability are expected to identify more with their group
and be more active, which lead them to feel hopeless for their own futures. On the other
hand, perceptions of instability are expected to directly reduce individual hopelessness.
The implications ofhopelessness for depression were also addressed. As an
extension to Hypothesis 2a, we expected that in a context of severe intergroup conflict,
people who identify with their group feel more individual hopelessness and exhibit
greater depressive symptomatology. This expectation is based on both theoretical and
empirical research on depression. Hopelessness is a component in Beck's (1967; Beck
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) cognitive triad model ofdepression, and is posited to be an
immediate cause ofdepression in the hopelessness model of depression (Abramson,
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Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Research supports this causal link (Alloy, Abramson, Safford,
& Gibb, 2006).
Finally, we also took into consideration the impact of perceived individual status,
in terms of the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (MacArthur Research
Network on Status & Health, 2007). Including individuals' sense of their own individual
status ensured that we could accurately assess the impact of their perceptions of the status
of their own group. One might expect that the two constructs are positively related, but
nevertheless distinct. We expected that individuals who attributed themselves higher
individual status would be less hopeless about their own futures and less depressed.
Perceptions ofhigh individual status have been reliably associated with decreased
depression and less negative affect (for a recent example, see Hu, Adler, Goldman,
Weinstein, & Seeman, 2005). Note that perceptions of individual status are distinct from
self-esteem, are related to objective indicators of social status (e.g., education or income),
but predict significant outcomes (e.g., physical health) above and beyond the contribution
of objective status indicators.
In sum, the present research examined social identity and involvement in
collective action, and their consequences for individual hopelessness and depression for
people in a context of severe escalating conflict. The studies were conducted in Lebanon
in 2007 and 2008, which was a period of great political upheaval. Study 1 was a survey
ofuniversity students in Lebanon, and was conducted to address our assumption that they
were aware that the political crisis was escalating, possibly leading to civil war, and
making young Lebanese adults feel hopeless. Studies 2 and 3 addressed the determinants
and consequences of social identification and involvement in collective action within the
framework of SIT for university students in Lebanon. Study 3 was a modified replication
of Study 2 in which our aim was to demonstrate once again that social identity can be
linked to individual hopelessness. In addition, Study 3 also examined how social identity
may be linked to depression in a context of severe escalating conflict. Study 2 addressed
all the hypotheses listed below. Study 3 addressed Hypotheses lb and 2b, in addition to
examining how perceived instability determines social identity and hopelessness (as per
Hypothesis la), and how identity determines hopelessness and depression (as per
Hypothesis 2a). In sum, the hypotheses addressed in Studies 2 and 3 were as follows:
Hypothesis la: People who perceive status differences as unstable and illegitimate, and
who perceive group boundaries as impermeable identify more with their group and, in
turn, are more involved in collective action.
Hypothesis lb: People who perceive their group as higher in status identify more with
their group.
Hypothesis 2a: In a context of severe escalating intergroup conflict, people who identify
with their group and are involved in collective action feel more hopeless for their own
futures.
Hypothesis 2b: People who perceive group status differences as unstable (i.e., greater
potential for upward group mobility) feel less individual hopelessness.
Study 1
In Study 1, we conducted a survey ofuniversity students' views on the political
conflict in their country. We expected them to perceive the political crisis as an escalating
conflict, leading possibly to a new civil war, and as leading young adults to feel hopeless
about their own futures. The survey was conducted over the internet. Internet-based
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research using questionnaires yields findings which are consistent with traditional paper-
based methods (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004).
Method
Participants
One-hundred and seventy-seven students completed the online survey; the data of
1 5 students were excluded due to missing data, which resulted in a final sample of 1 62
participants (84 women and 78 men). Participants reported their country of residence and
the university at which they were enrolled; these items served to confirm that participants
were university students living in Lebanon. Mean age was 21.73 years (range: 18 - 32).
Participants also reported the religious group (i.e., Ta'ifa, plural Tawa 'if) to which they
and their family belong. Percentages were as follows: Maronite (29.1%), Sunni (22.8%),
Shiite (15.4%), Druze (9.3%), Greek Orthodox (8.6%), Greek Catholic (8.0%), Armenian
Christian (3.1%), Other Christian (1.2%), and Other Muslim (.6%). There was no
response for 1 .9% ofparticipants.
Materials
Perceptions ofthepolitical conflict. Perceptions of the political conflict in
Lebanon were assessed with 5 items: a) "The persisting attempts by my and other Tawa 'if
to gain more political power continue to improve the situation in Lebanon," b) "The
attempts over time ofmy Ta 'ifa and other Tawa 'ifto gain more political power have been
effective," c) "Since 2005, the escalation in public demonstrations by the different
Tawa 'ifhas made a civil war less likely," d) "Sometimes, I think that when my or other
Tawa 'if'try to gain political power with public demonstrations, it actually worsens the
situation for everyone in Lebanon," and e) "The persisting attempts by my and other
32
Tawa 'ifXo gain more political power are leading young Lebanese adults to feel hopeless
about their own future." Participants responded on 7-point Likert scales with endpoints
strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (7). Items were presented in one of two random
orders. Items a, b, and c were reverse coded so that higher scores reflect more negative
perceptions. The questions were presented in English.
Procedure
Participants were recruited over the internet using Facebook. Facebook is a peer-
network website on which individuals from across the world can create a profile
containing personal information for the purpose of networking with peers. Individuals
can also join different social, recreational, and university groups on Facebook. For the
purpose of the present study, we recruited participants from 10 university groups on
Facebook that are associated with universities in Lebanon (e.g., the American University
of Beirut Facebook group). In short, we contacted the administrators of the different
groups to obtain approval for recruiting participants from their groups. Following
approval, a message describing the survey and providing the URL link to our online
survey was sent to all group members inviting them to complete the survey. In the
message, the researcher (N.T.) introduced himself as being a Lebanese citizen completing
graduate work in Canada, and that his thesis project concerned Lebanese young adults
and their "views on the current situation in Lebanon."
Results and Discussion
Responses to the 5 items were submitted to a principal components analysis with
oblimin rotation. A 2-factor solution emerged, with the factors positively correlated (r =
.22). Items a, b, and c loaded on the first factor with an eigenvalue of 2.04, which
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explained 40.7% of the variance. Items d and e loaded on the second factor with an
eigenvalue of 1.17, which explained 23.3% of the variance. Items a, b, and c were
averaged to form a scale measuring the perceived social consequences of the political
conflict (a = .64), whereas items d and e were averaged to form a scale measuring the
perceived psychological consequences of the political conflict (a = .60).
For the perceived social consequences, the mean of 4.95 (SD = 1 .28) indicates
that participants perceived the situation as one of escalating collective action by
competing groups, and that this action was ineffective, not improving the situation in
Lebanon, and potentially leading to a new civil war. The value of 5 on the scale
corresponds to somewhat agree. Concerning the perceived psychological consequences,
the mean of 5.36 (SD = 1 .35) indicates that participants tended to perceive the escalating
collective action by the competing groups as worsening the situation for everybody in
Lebanon and as leading young adults to feel hopeless for their own future. These findings
are in line with the views expressed in news and research reports regarding the political
conflict in Lebanon (e.g., Chakmakjian, 2006; Hourani & Sensenig-Dabbous, 2007).
Finally, separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean differences
between the religious groups on each scale. No significant differences emerged for
analyses including only the 6 major groups, or including all groups. As such, the bleak
view was held regardless of one's group affiliation.
Study 2
In Study 2, we applied SIT to understand social identity processes related to the
intergroup conflict in Lebanon, and addressed a hypothesis derived from Staw's (1997)
escalation of commitment theory. The study addressed Hypotheses la, lb, 2a, and 2b that
34
are described above. In sum, we examined the factors that determine the extent to which
people identify with their group and engage in collective action. Further, we examined
the degree individuals identify with their group and their involvement in collective action
as determinants of individual hopelessness.
Method
Participants
Six-hundred and thirty-two students were recruited at different universities in and
near Beirut, Lebanon. The data of 66 students were excluded due to missing data, which
resulted in a final sample 566 participants (344 women, 222 men). Mean age of the
sample was 20.38 years (range: 17-41). Participants reported the Ta'ifa (i.e., religious
group) to which they and their family belong. Percentages were as follows: Maronite
(32.3%), Shiite (18.4%), Sunni (1 1.8%), Greek Orthodox (11.1%), Druze (10.2%), Greek
Catholic (10.1%), Other Christian (2.7%), Armenian Christian (2.1%), Other (.7%), and
Other Muslim (.2%). There was no response for .4% of participants.
Materials
Questionnaires were presented in either English or Arabic. The different scales
were translated from English to standard Arabic by a certified translator in Lebanon.
Each scale was coded such that higher scores reflect more of the construct. Participants
responded on 7-point Likert scales with endpoints strongly disagree (1) and strongly
agree (7), unless indicated.
Perceived illegitimacy. Four items assessed perceptions of illegitimate status
differences (e.g., "Members ofmy Ta'ifa don't have the political power they deserve").
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Perceived impermeability. Three items assessed perceptions of impermeable
group boundaries (e.g., "No matter what effort an individual makes, he or she can never
truly become a member of a different Ta'ifa").
Perceived instability. Perceptions ofunstable status differences were defined as
an expectation that group status and the country will improve in the future. Positive
expectations for one's group (e.g., "My Ta'ifa will prosper economically in the future")
and positive expectations for the country (e.g., "I have great faith in Lebanon's economic
future") were each measured with 3 items. SIT defines perceptions of unstable status
differences as the capacity for low status group members to conceive an improvement in
their low status position within the intergroup hierarchy. Positive expectations for the
future of the country were also included as part of the construct of instability because the
competing groups view their outcomes as being tied to the outcome of the country as a
whole (International Crisis Group, 2006).
Perceived group status. Perceptions of group status concern individuals'
subjective beliefs about their groups' standing in the country along the dimensions of
income, political power, and occupation. A 10-step ladder scale was used, which was
adapted from the McArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (MacArthur Research
Network on Status & Health, 2007), and it was stated that the Tawa '//stood on various
steps. Respondents placed their group on a step.
Perceived individual status. Perceived individual status is an indicator of an
individual's subjective beliefs about their standing in a society along the dimensions of
income, education, and occupation. The McArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status was
used. It is a 10-step ladder scale. Instructions were modified in one respect, with an
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explicit reference to Lebanon (to avoid comparisons with Canada). Respondents placed
themselves on a step.
Social identification. In line with Tajfel (1978) and Ellemers, Kortekass, and
Ouwerkerk (1999), we included 3 cognitive items (e.g., "I identify with other members of
my Ta'ifa"), 3 affective items (e.g., "I am strongly attached to my Ta'ifa"), and 3
evaluative items (e.g., "I feel good about my Ta'ifa").
Collective action. Three items measured level of involvement in collective action
to support one's group (e.g., "I participate in public demonstrations that aim to support the
political power ofmy Ta'ifa"). Participants responded on 7-point scales with endpoints
not at all (I) and extremely (7).
Hopelessness. Three items measured feelings ofhopelessness for one's future
(e.g., "When I think ofmy own life, things won't work out the way I want them to"),
which were adapted from the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, &
Trexler, 1974).
Procedure
Participants were recruited from classrooms at universities in Lebanon to
complete questionnaires. The questionnaires were presented in one of two
counterbalanced orders. The researcher (N.T.) introduced himself as a Lebanese citizen
completing graduate work in Canada, and that his thesis project concerned how Lebanese
young adults perceive themselves "in the context of Lebanese society and the many
social, political, and economic issues that are facing Lebanon today." He introduced the
study to the students while in their classrooms and invited them to participate. Interested
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participants immediately completed the questionnaires. The participation rate was
approximately 95%.
Results
Descriptive statistics, internal consistency coefficients, and correlations between
the scales are presented in Table 1 . For the perceived instability scale, all 6 items loaded
on a single factor in a principal components analysis with oblimin rotation. The
eigenvalue was 2.40, and the factor explained 40.1 % of the variance. As such, the 6
items were averaged into one scale. To validate ratings ofperceived group status
differences, they were compared to documented differences in political power between
the groups (Trabulsi, 2007). A one-way ANOVA across the 6 major groups indicated
significant mean differences in participants' perceptions of their groups' status (F (5,
531) = 5.52,/? < .001). Sunnis had the highest perceptions of group status (M= 6.93, SD
= 2.05) followed by the Shiites (M= 6.19, SD = 2.53), Greek Catholics (M = 5.91, SD =
1.89), Maronites (M= 5.90, SD = 2.12), Greek Orthodox (M= 5.43, SD = 2.09), and
Druze (M= 5.07, SD = 2.30). These results are consistent with the Lebanese government
power structure in that Sunnis have the most power, followed by the Shiites, and
Maronites, and finally the Druze, who have the least power (Trabulsi, 2007).
Hypotheses la, lb, 2a, and 2b were evaluated using structural equation modeling
(SEM; Kline 2005). The hypotheses were expressed as paths in a model: perceptions of
instability, illegitimacy, impermeability, and group status each led to social identification.
In turn, social identification led to collective action which, in turn, led to individual
hopelessness. Perceived instability and individual status also had direct paths to
individual hopelessness. We used EQS version 6 for Windows (Bentler, 2005) with
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Maximum Likelihood estimation procedures that analyzed the covariance structure of the
data. Model fit was assessed using the likelihood ratio chi-square (?2), the comparative fit
index (CFI), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA) and its 90% confidence interval (CI). A good fit is reflected in
a nonsignificant ?2, a CFI close to 1 , a value of SRMR less than .1 , RMSEA less than or
equal to .05, and CI being 0 to .08. Finally, we used Bollen and Long's (1993) criterion
that the %2/dfratio should be close to or less than 2.
The SEM analysis provided an admissible fit to the data (?2 (15) = 23.83,/» = .07,
CFI = .98, RMSEA = .03, CI = .00 - .06, SRMR = .04, and ?2/?/= 1 .59). However, given
a residual between perceived individual status and social identification, the analysis was
repeated after a path was added leading from perceived individual status to social
identification. The second SEM analysis provided an excellent fit to the data (?2 (14) =
18.03,;? = .21, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .02, CI = .00 - .05, SRMR = .03, and ?7#= 1 .29).
The model is presented in Figure 1 with standardized path coefficients. A chi-square
difference test indicated that the addition of the path significantly improved model fit
(??2 (1) = 10.80,/? < .05). The model explained 19% ofvariance in social identification
(R2 = .19), and over 20% ofvariance in each of collective action (R2 - .21), and
individual hopelessness (R2 = .22). Finally, with the exception of some paths for group or
individual status becoming nonsignificant, the model provided an excellent fit to the data
after controlling for religious group affiliation,1 and when comparing parameters across
language groups.2 As well, excluding group self-esteem from the social identity measure
left the model intact.3
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Hypothesis la was that individuals who perceive status differences as unstable
and illegitimate, and group boundaries as impermeable identify more with their group
and, in turn, are more involved in collective action. As expected, perceptions ofunstable
(ß = .31, ? = 8.06,/? < .001) and illegitimate (ß = .27, ? = 6.85,/? < .001) status differences
and impermeable group boundaries (ß = .12, ? = 3.23,/? < .05) increased social
identification. In turn, social identification (ß = .45, ? = 12.07,/? < .001) increased
involvement in collective action. Furthermore, perceptions of instability (ß = .14, ? =
6.70,/? < .001), illegitimacy (ß = .12, ? = 5.96,/? < .001), and impermeability (ß = .06, ? =
3.12,/? < .05) all increased involvement in collective action through social identification.
Hypothesis lb was that individuals who perceive their group as higher in status identify
more with their group. Indeed, perceptions ofhigh group status increased social
identification (ß = .10, ? = 2.52, ? < .05; see Footnote 1, however). Furthermore,
perceptions ofhigh group status (ß = .05, ? = 2.47,/? < .05) increased involvement in
collective action through social identification.
Hypothesis 2a was that in a context of severe escalating intergroup conflict,
individuals who identify with their group and are involved in collective action feel more
hopeless for their own futures. As expected, social identification (ß = .06, ? = 3.22,/? <
.05) indirectly increased individual hopelessness through involvement in collective
action, and collective action directly (ß = .13, ? = 3.34,/? < .05) increased individual
hopelessness. Hypothesis 2b was that individuals who perceive group status differences
as unstable feel less individual hopelessness. Indeed, perceptions ofunstable status
differences directly (ß = -.42, ? = -1 1.07,/? < .001) reduced individual hopelessness. 4
Finally, in line with expectations, individuals who perceive their own status as
high feel less hopeless for their own futures. Indeed, perceptions ofhigh individual status
(ß = -.21, ? = -5.71, ? < .001) decreased individual hopelessness. Unexpectedly,
individuals who perceived their own individual status as high identified less with their
group and were less involved in collective action to support their group. Specifically,
perceptions ofhigh individual status directly reduced social identification (ß = -.10, ? =
2.42,? < .05; see Footnote 1 , however) and indirectly reduced involvement in collective
action through social identification (ß = -.04 ? = -2.37, ? < .05).
Suppressor effect. In line with hypothesis 2a, social identification with one's
group predicted involvement in collective action (ß = .45, ? = 12.07,? < .001), which in
turn predicted increases in individual hopelessness (ß = .13, ? = 3.33,? < .05; see Figure
1). Analyses revealed the operation of a suppressor effect (Conger, 1974). The zero-order
correlation between collective action and individual hopelessness (r = .06) was
nonsignificant. However, a partial correlation revealed that collective action correlated
positively with individual hopelessness (r = .09, ? = .03) after controlling for all variables
in the model (see Figure 1 for the variables). Yet after only controlling for perceived
instability, the partial correlation between collective action and individual hopelessness
was significant (r = .15, ? < .001).
Similarly, social identification was not correlated with individual hopelessness (r
= -.02). However, a partial correlation indicated that social identification correlated with
individual hopelessness (r = .1 \,p = .01) after controlling for perceptions of group status,
impermeability, illegitimacy, and instability. In fact, only controlling for perceptions of
instability allowed the identification of this relation, since the magnitude of the partial
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correlation did not change. In sum, perceived instability is a suppressor for the relation
between social identification and collective action on the one hand and individual
hopelessness on the other.
Test ofalternative models
As recommended by Kline (2005), we tested alternative models. Apart from the
various fit indices mentioned above, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to
compare alternatives to the model in Figure 1 . In the first alternative model, perceived
group status and perceived individual status were examined as consequences of
hopelessness. The SEM analysis revealed a poor fit to the data (?2 (17) = 83..77, ? < .001,
CFI = .86, RMSEA = .08, CI = .07 - .10, SRMR = .06, and %2/df= 4.93). As such, the
first alternative model was rejected. In the second alternative model, hopelessness was
examined as a determinant of social identification which, in turn, predicted involvement
in collective action. Perceptions of the group hierarchy and individual status maintained
the same causal roles as in Figure 1 . The SEM analysis indicated that the model did not
provide an adequate fit to the data (?2 (14) = 26.37, ? = .02, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04, CI
= .01 - .06, SRMR = .03, and %2/df= 1.88). As such, the second alternative model was
rejected. In the third alternative model, we tested the reverse ofthe model in Figure 1 .
That is, we examined whether individual hopelessness is driving the relations between
the variables in the model. The SEM analysis indicated that the model provided a poor fit
to the data (?2 (14) = 32.01,/? <.001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05, CI - .03 - .07, SRMR =
.03, and %2/df= 2.29). In sum, the three alternative models do not provide good fits to the
data. In addition, the AIC values associated with these alternative models were 50.25, -
4.29, and .28, which are larger than the -1 3.46 AIC value for the model in Figure 1 .
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Discussion
Participants in Study 2 reported on how hopeless they felt for their own futures,
and a significant amount ofvariance on this measure could be explained by their social
identification, engagement in collective action, as well as their perceptions of instability
(i.e., ofpotential upward mobility) for their group. In line with Hypothesis 2a, individuals
who identified more with their group and who engaged in more collective action were
more hopeless about their own futures. As well, in line with Hypothesis 2b, individuals
who expected more upward mobility for their group were also more hopeful regarding
their own personal futures. As noted earlier, these findings contrast with much previous
research on the psychological benefits of social identity and collective action, but severe
escalating conflict between groups is a distinctive context in which people may be aware
of significant potential loss (Staw, 1997).
A striking feature of the results of Study 2 is that perceived instability influenced
individual hopelessness in different, and competing, ways. The more participants
perceived that their group would be better off in the future, the more they identified with
their group and the more they engaged in collective action. As noted above, we also
found in Study 2 that identity and collective action were linked to feeling more hopeless
about one's own future. As such, feeling hopeful about one's group indirectly leads to
feeling more hopeless about one's own future. At the same time, we also found that
people who were more hopeful for their group also felt more hopeful for themselves,
without any intervening variables linking these two perceptions.
Perceived instability predicted social identity and collective action, and acted as a
suppressor (Conger, 1974) in masking the relation between social identity and collective
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action on the one hand, and hopelessness on the other. This was apparent in the following
ways. First, there was no zero-order correlation observed between identity and
hopelessness, or between collective action and hopelessness. However, once one
controlled for shared variance with perceptions of instability, the relation between these
constructs emerged: both identity and collective action were seen to be linked to
increased hopelessness for one's own future. Suppressor effects are not unusual in
psychological research (Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniew & Tracy, 2004), and in particular
they have been identified in prior research on intergroup phenomena (Branscombe,
Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Nevertheless, replication is important, and this was one of the
purposes of Study 3.
Some findings that emerged in Study 2 are replications ofprior SIT research. As
in prior research, greater perceptions of instability, illegitimacy, and impermeability all
predicted greater identification and collective action. The one hypothesis that was not
clearly supported was Hypothesis lb, which was that people who perceive their group as
higher in status identify more with their group. This hypothesis is consistent with findings
ofprior experimental research (e.g., see Ellemers, 1993 for a review), and the expected
relation did emerge in the overall SEM model reported in Figure 1 . However, perceived
group status was ofno consequence for social identity when analyses controlled for
religious group affiliation (see footnote 1 ). In short, the relation between perceptions of
group status and social identity is unclear and was addressed again in Study 3.
Study 3
The goal of Study 3 was to replicate the key, novel findings of Study 2. We
examined once again the impact ofperceptions of instability (i.e., potential upward
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mobility of one's group) on social identity and on individual hopelessness. The goal was
to confirm that perceptions of instability are linked to greater identification (as per
Hypothesis la), which in tum would be linked to more individual hopelessness (as per
Hypothesis 2a). At the same time, perceptions of instability would be directly linked to
less individual hopelessness (Hypothesis 2b). These results were expected, given the
context of escalating commitment (Staw, 1997) in severe intergroup conflict. As well, we
aimed to replicate the suppressor effect of instability on the relation between identity and
hopelessness.
We also examined perceived group status in Study 3, just as we had in Study 2.
Indeed, the findings for perceived group status were equivocal in Study 2, and our aim in
Study 3 was to collect more data in an attempt to clarify its relation to social identity.
Hypothesis lb remained, which was that perceptions ofhigher group status are linked to
greater identification. Lastly, we examined the implications ofhopelessness for
depression, with the expectation that more hopelessness would be linked to greater
depression. This is by no means a novel prediction, but the novelty here is that we are
linking social identity processes to such outcomes.
Method
Participants
Three-hundred and twenty students were recruited at different universities in
Lebanon. The data of 42 students were excluded due to missing data, which resulted in a
final sample of 278 participants (170 women and 108 men). Mean age was 20.45 years
(range: 1 8 - 38). Participants reported their religious group as in Study 2. Percentages
were as follows: Maronite (34.1%), Shiite (20.5%), Sunni (12.6%), Greek Orthodox
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(12.2%), Greek Catholic (7.9%), Druze (6.5%), Armenian Christian (2.5%), Other
Christian (2.2%), and Other (.4%). There was no response for 1 .1% ofparticipants.
Materials
For the constructs addressed in Study 3, we used the same questionnaires as in
Study 2. Participants completed measures ofperceived instability, perceived group status,
perceived individual status, social identification, and individual hopelessness.
Participants also completed a measure of depression. Participants completing the
questionnaires in English (n = 192) were given the Center for Epidemiological Studies
Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), whereas participants completing the
questionnaires in Arabic (n = 86) were given the standard Arabic version of the Beck
Depression Inventory - II (BDI-II; Ghareeb, 2000).
The CES-D is a 20-item self-report questionnaire designed to measure the
frequency of depressive symptoms in the general population. The CES-D has high
internal consistency ranging from .80 to .90 (Nezu, Nezu, McClure, & Zwick, 2002;
Radloff, 1991; Roberts Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1991). The standard Arabic BDI-II is a 21-
item self-report questionnaire which was adapted from the BDI-II developed by Beck,
Steer, and Brown (1996). The standard Arabic version ofthe BDI-II has high internal
consistency ranging from .82 to .93 (Alamari, 2005, 2006).
Procedure
Participants were recruited from classrooms at universities in Lebanon to
complete questionnaires. The questionnaires were presented in one of two
counterbalanced orders. Participants were given the same instructions as in Study 2.
Participation rate was approximately 95%.
46
Results
The descriptive statistics, internal consistency coefficients, and correlations
between the scales are presented in Table 2. For the perceived group status scale, a one-
way ANOVA indicated that the rank of the means for the 6 major groups was virtually
the same as in Study 2 (F(I, 261) = 3.83, ? < .01); Sunnis had the highest perceptions of
group status (M = 6. 94, SD = 1 .96) followed by Maronites (M = 6. 25, SD = 2.03), Greek
Catholics (M = 6. 09, SD = 1.99), Shiites (M= 5.81, SD = 2.39), Greek Orthodox (M=
5.65, SD = 2.01), and Druze (M= 4.50, SD = 1 .92). For the perceived instability scale, all
6 items loaded on a single factor in a principal components analysis with oblimin
rotation. The eigenvalue was 2.65, and the factor explained 44.2 % of the variance. As
such, the 6 items were averaged into one scale. Concerning depression, the CES-D
exhibited high reliability (a = .87) with a mean of 20.94 (SD = 10.35); the BDI-II
exhibited high reliability (a = .78) with a mean of 14.10 (SD = 7.34). There were no
religious group differences for each scale. The BDI-II and CES-D scores were each
standardized separately, and the standardized scores were used in the analyses.
The hypotheses were evaluated using structural equation modeling (SEM). The
hypotheses were expressed as paths in a model: perceptions of instability and group
status each lead to social identification. In turn, social identification leads to individual
hopelessness which, in turn, leads to depression. Perceived instability and individual
status also had each a direct path to individual hopelessness.
The SEM analysis indicated that the model did not provide an adequate fit to the
data (?2 (7) = 2436, ? < .05, CFI = .93, RMSEA - .10, CI = .06 - .14, SRMR = .07, and
X2/df= 3.48). There were residuals between perceived group status and depression, and
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social identification and depression. Furthermore, the path leading from perceived group
status to social identification was nonsignificant. As such, the analysis was repeated after
introducing paths to address the residuals, and omitting the nonsignificant path. The
second SEM analysis indicated that the model provided an excellent fit to the data (?2 (6)
= 4.70,? = .58, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .00, CI =.00 - .07, SRMR = .03, and x2/df= .78). The
model is presented in Figure 2 with standardized path coefficients. A chi-square
difference test indicated that the re-specifications for the model significantly improved
model fit (??2 (1) = 19.66,/? < .001). The model explained over 25% of the variance in
hopelessness (R2 = .26) and depression (R2 = .29), which are large effects, and 9% of the
variance in social identification (R2 = .09). Note that the model provided an excellent fit
to the data after controlling for religious group affiliation5 and the language of the
questionnaires.6 As well, excluding group self-esteem from the social identity measure
left the model intact.7
In line with Hypothesis la and 2a, we expected that individuals in a context of
severe escalating intergroup conflict who perceive group status differences as unstable
identify more with their group and experience more individual hopelessness. Indeed,
perceived instability (ß = .29, ? = 5.10,/? < .001) directly increased social identification,
and indirectly increased individual hopelessness through social identification (ß = .05, ? =
2.76, ? < .05). As well, social identification (ß = .18, ? = 3.25, ? < .05) directly increased
individual hopelessness. We also expected that individuals who reported more
hopelessness would also be more depressed, and this relation did emerge (ß = .45, ? =
8.68,? < .001). In addition, social identification indirectly increased depression through
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individual hopelessness (ß = .08, ? = 3.28, ? < .05). Unexpectedly, social identification (ß
= -.10, ? = -1 .96,p = .05) also directly reduced depression.
Perceived instability was expected to directly lead to less hopelessness, according
to Hypothesis 2b. Indeed, perceived instability (ß = -.48, ? = -8.98,/? < .001) directly
decreased individual hopelessness. As well, perceived instability indirectly decreased
depression (ß = -.22, ? = -6.18,/? < .001). We also expected instability to act as a
suppressor for the relation between social identification and individual hopelessness, just
as it did in Study 2. The same effect emerged. The zero-order correlation between social
identification and hopelessness (r = .04) was non-significant. A partial correlation
revealed that social identification correlated positively with individual hopelessness (r =
.20,? < .01) after controlling for perceived instability.
Hypothesis lb was that individuals who perceive their group as higher in status
identify more with their group. Contrary to hypothesis, perceived group status did not
predict social identification. The one effect that emerged was that perceptions of high
group status directly (ß = -.21, ? = -3.98,/? < .01) predicted less depression. Finally, it
was expected that individuals who perceive themselves as having high individual status
feel less individual hopelessness. Perceived individual status (ß = -.22, ? = -4.24,/? <
.001) directly decreased individual hopelessness. Furthermore, perceived individual
status indirectly decreased depression through individual hopelessness (ß = -.10, ? = -
3.81,/?<.05).
Test ofalternative models
We tested three alternative models. In the first alternative model, depression was
examined as a determinant ofperceptions of group status and individual status. In short,
the alternative model was identical to the model in Figure 2 except that perceived group
status and perceived individual status were now examined as consequences of depression.
The SEM analysis indicated that the model provided a poor fit to the data (?2 (7) = 34.48,
? < .001, CFI = .88, RMSEA = .12, CI = .08 - .16, SRMR = .07, and %2/df= 4.93). As
such, the first alternative model was rejected. In the second alternative model, we tested
the reverse of the model in Figure 2. The SEM analysis indicated that the model provided
an admissible fit to the data (?2 (6) = il.35, ? = .08, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06, CI = .00 -
.11, SRMR = .04, and i2/df= 1 .89). However, the path from hopelessness to social
identification was nonsignificant. Furthermore, there was a residual between social
identification and perceived group status; the latter relation is implausible on conceptual
grounds. As such, the second alternative model was rejected. In the third model, we
tested whether individual hopelessness may determine depression, social identity,
perceived instability, and perceived individual status. The SEM analysis indicated that
the model provided an admissible fit to the data (?2 (6) = 1 135, ? = .08, CFI = .98,
RMSEA = .06, CI = .00 - .1 1, SRMR - .04, and ?2/#= 1.89). However, the path from
hopelessness to social identification was nonsignificant and there was a residual between
social identification and perceived group status. As such, the third alternative model was
rejected. Furthermore, the three alternative models were rejected on the grounds that the
AIC values associated with these models were 26.39, .12, and .12, which are larger than
the AIC value of -6.3 1 for the model in Figure 2.
Discussion
Participants in Study 3 reported on their feelings ofhopelessness for their
personal futures and the extent to which they experienced depressive symptoms. A
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significant amount ofvariance on these measures could be explained by the degree of
social identification with one's group and perceptions of hopefulness for one's group
(perceived instability). A novel finding of Study 3 was that social identity impacted
depression in two opposite ways. In line with Hypothesis 2a, individuals who identified
with their group felt more hopelessness for their own futures and, in turn, exhibited
greater depressive symptoms. At the same time, individuals who identified with their
group reported less depression. This latter finding was unexpected, but is in line with
previous research indicating that social identification enhances adjustment and well-being
(e.g., Goodman, 2003; Greenfield & Marks, 2007). As such, social identification had
both positive and negative consequences for depression via different pathways.
In line with Hypothesis la, individuals who were more hopeful for their group
(perceived instability) identified more with their group and in turn felt more hopelessness
for their own futures. As well, in line with Hypothesis 2b, the more individuals were
hopeful for the future of their group, the less they felt hopeless for their own futures.
Perceived instability also acted as a suppressor in masking the relation between social
identity and hopelessness. These findings are a replication of the relations between
perceived instability, social identity, and hopelessness which were observed in Study 2.
Concerning perceptions ofgroup status, Hypothesis lb was that individuals who
perceive their group as higher in status identify more with their group. However, this
hypothesis was not confirmed in Study 3. What did emerge was that individuals who
perceived their group as higher in status exhibited less depression. The latter finding is in
line with previous research indicating that perceptions ofhigh group status enhance
adjustment (Terry et al. 2006).
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The mean scores obtained for the depression measures in Study 3 indicated that
participants were experiencing a significant amount ofdistress. Indeed, a relatively large
proportion ofparticipants would be classified as depressed. Recall that participants either
completed the CES-D (if they completed the study materials in English) or the standard
Arabic version of the BDI-II. Applying the cutoff of 24 (Roberts et al., 1991) indicated
that 34.9% ofrespondents to the CES-D would be classified as depressed. As to the BDI-
II, Ghareeb (2000) suggested that scores below 20 reflect no or mild depression, and
scores above 19 reflect at least mild depression. According to this cutoff, 22.1% of
respondents would be classified as at least mildly depressed. These findings are
consistent with those of Study 1 , in which respondents indicated that the political conflict
was leading young adults to feel hopeless about their own future.
General Discussion
The purpose of the present research was to examine the determinants and
psychological consequences of social identification with one's group and involvement in
collective action to support one's group in a context of severe and escalating intergroup
conflict. We investigated whether individuals who identify with their groups and are
involved in collective action to support their groups feel more hopelessness for their
personal futures. This hypothesis was derived from Staw's (1997) theory of escalating
commitment. The population studied was young Lebanese adults attending university in
and near Beirut, Lebanon. The research was conducted in 2007 and 2008, which was a
period of severe and escalating conflict in Lebanon, including riots, deaths, injuries, and
much property damage.
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A major finding of the present research was that perceived instability, social
identification, and involvement in collective action were linked to hopelessness for young
adults. In particular, participants' perceptions that there was hope for improvement for
their Ta 'ifa (perceived instability) had two opposite effects on individuals' sense of
hopelessness for their own futures. On the one hand, individuals who were hopeful for
their groups' future felt less hopelessness for their own futures. On the other hand, we
found that individuals who felt hopeful for their groups' future identified more with their
group, were more involved in collective action, and in turn experienced more
hopelessness for their own futures. These observed relations appeared in Study 2, and
were replicated in Study 3, in which a measure of involvement in collective action was
not included.
Furthermore, in Study 2, perceived instability acted as a suppressor for the
relation between social identity and collective action on the one hand and individual
hopelessness on the other. That is, there was no zero-order correlation observed between
identity and hopelessness, or between collective action and hopelessness. Yet, controlling
for perceptions of instability allowed for the identification of the consequences of social
identity and collective action on individual hopelessness. The suppressor relation
between perceived instability, social identity, and hopelessness was replicated in Study 3.
Note that suppressor relationships in psychological research are not uncommon (Palhus et
al., 2004) and suppression effects have been identified in prior research on intergroup
processes (e.g., Harvey et al., 1999).
Another finding was that social identity had both positive and negative
consequences for adjustment via different pathways. On the one hand, individuals who
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identified with their groups felt more hopelessness (in Studies 2 and 3) and, in turn, more
depression (in Study 3). On the other hand, the degree to which individuals identified
with their groups directly reduced depression (in Study 3). The latter finding is in line
with previous research indicating that social identification enhances adjustment and well-
being (e.g., Greenfield & Marks, 2007; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). In short, social
identity influenced depression in a rather complex manner.
The juxtaposed quotes at the outset of the manuscript shed light on the complexity
of the relation between social identity and adjustment. Hourani (1954) suggested that
identification with one's religious group in Lebanon is beneficial as it provides
individuals with a sense ofbelonging. In contrast, the President of Lebanon recently
suggested that religious group affiliation has negative consequences in a context of severe
escalating intergroup conflict. Taken together, the quotes reflect the complex relation
between social identity and depression in a context of severe intergroup conflict. On the
one hand, identifying with a group has psychological benefits. On the other hand,
identifying with a group in a context of severe escalating intergroup conflict may also
have negative consequences.
Another finding was that perceptions of group status were not related to social
identity. In Study 2, perceptions ofhigh group status increased group identification, yet
this relation became nonsignificant after controlling for religious group affiliation (see
footnote 1). In Study 3, perceptions of group status were unrelated to social identification.
Taken together, the hypothesis lb that perceptions ofhigh group status increases
identification with one's group, which was derived from SIT and prior SIT research, was
not confirmed. As such, the relation between perceived group status and social identity is
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unclear. However, perceived group status played a different role and determined
depression in Study 3. Specifically, individuals who perceived their group as higher in
status felt less depressed, which is in line with previous research indicating that
perceptions of high group status enhances adjustment (Terry et al. 2006).
The present research also has implications for the hopelessness model of
depression (Abramson et al., 1989). According to the hopelessness model, individuals
who experience negative life events may feel hopelessness and in turn depression, if they
attribute negative life events to stable and global causes, and infer that negative
consequences will follow from the negative events. Even though the present research did
not examine the hopelessness model of depression, it is worth noting that the
psychosocial variables that were addressed in studies 2 and 3, namely individuals'
perceptions of instability of group status differences and the degree they identify with
their groups, were linked to feelings ofhopelessness for one's future and depression. In
short, perceptions of the status hierarchy and social identity may be another dimension in
which to examine determinants ofhopelessness and depression within the framework of
the hopelessness model.
The present research has limitations. The first limitation concerns the
correlational nature of the data. Specifically, causal relations can only be indirectly
inferred from correlational data. However, previous field and experimental research
investigating SIT provide support for the causal direction of the determinants of identity
and collective action (e.g., see Ellemers, 1993, for a review; Mummendey et al., 1999).
What remains less clear is the causal relation between social identification and collective
action on the one hand, and hopelessness on the other. However, we tested different
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causal models in which hopelessness was a determinant of social identity and collective
action and these models could not adequately explain the data. Furthermore, some of
these alternative models required paths that were not conceptually sound. As such, the
findings of Studies 2 and 3 support a conceptualization ofhopelessness as a consequence
of social identification and collective action in a context of severe and escalating
intergroup conflict.
The second limitation concerns identity maintenance strategies. The present
research focused only on collective action in Study 2 and did not include other identity
maintenance strategies, such as social creativity (e.g., downward group comparisons). As
such, future research can examine a range of identity maintenance strategies and how
they contribute to positive social identity, adjustment, and well-being. Schmitt and
Branscombe (2002) recommended examining different identity enhancing strategies as
possible mediators by which social identification affects psychological well-being.
A question that can be raised is whether participants in the present research are
representative of the demography of the religious groups in Lebanon. The answer is
unclear since the last population census was conducted in 1932 (Salibi, 1988; Trabulsi,
2007). The results of attempts to estimate the size of the religious groups vary widely by
source (Faour, 1991, 2007). As such, no one knows with certainty the size of the religious
groups in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the present studies were conducted across a range of
universities in and around Beirut in a deliberate attempt to include most groups in a
representative manner.
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Implicationsfor Lebanese young adults and the broader context ofLebanon
The present research has implications for Lebanese young adults. The present
research indicates that religious group affiliation is still alive and well in Lebanon after
18 years since the termination of the 1975-1990 civil war. Indeed, in the present studies
Lebanese young adults tended to identify with their religious groups and were somewhat
involved in collective action to support their groups. In short, religious group affiliation
for Lebanese young adults remains an important part of their self-concept, which is in
line with previous research on Lebanon indicating that young adults exhibit significant
levels of group consciousness (e.g., Haddad, 2002).
Furthermore, a power-struggle between the religious groups, or coalition of
religious groups, does not bode well for the stability and development of Lebanon.
Correspondingly, the political crisis may also have consequences for the adjustment of
Lebanese young adults. A relatively large proportion of young adults in Study 3 reported
experiencing depressive symptoms (34.9% using the CES-D and 22.1 % using the BDI-
II). Furthermore, the adjustment of young adults was linked to their expectations of
improvement in their Ta 'i/a's standing and their feelings ofhopelessness for their own
futures. Indeed, young adults who felt more hopeless for the fate oftheir Ta 'ifa also
experienced more hopelessness for their own futures and exhibited greater depression.
The present findings also indicate that young Lebanese adults are well aware of
the status of their group in their country. Participants ranked their groups on a ladder
scale representing where the different Tawa '//stand in Lebanon in terms ofpolitical
power, wealth, and occupations. The rank order of the means for each religious group
was virtually the same across Studies 2 and 3, and corresponded to documented
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differences in political power between the religious groups (Trabulsi, 2007).
Furthermore, these perceptions of group status had consequences for adjustment.
Individuals who perceived their Ta 'ifa as lower in status exhibited more depressive
symptoms in Study 3.
In sum, the young Lebanese adults who participated in Studies 2 and 3 identified
with their groups, were aware of their groups' status, and were more depressed if they
belonged to a lower status group. More generally, the overall results of Studies 2 and 3
indicate that social identity processes are operating along the lines of SIT, and can be
linked to major indicators of maladjustment, such as hopelessness and depressive
symptoms. In terms of the broader context of Lebanon, the present findings are striking
when juxtaposed with the desire of some political leaders to secularize Lebanese politics
(e.g., "Karami Calls For Abolishing Sectarianism In Politics", 2008). Indeed, ifuniversity
students reflect the political attitudes of society at large and are considered to be an
important force that drives social change in Lebanon (Faour, 1998), then it would seem
that the secularization of Lebanese politics is far beyond Lebanon's horizon.
Conclusions
The present research demonstrates the utility of a social psychological approach
to examining objective conflicts over scarce resources. Undoubtedly, there is more to
objective intergroup conflict than the social psychological component. Indeed, Tajfel and
Turner (1979, 1986) suggested that objective conflicts are primarily driven by social,
political, economic, and historical processes which go beyond social psychological
processes. However, they also suggested that the social psychological or subjective
account is interwoven with the objective determinants of intergroup conflict. The present
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research demonstrates that the political conflict in Lebanon has a clear social
psychological aspect. The present studies contribute to a better understanding of
individuals' psychological functioning in a context of severe intergroup conflict.
In sum, the present research indicates that the dynamics of social identity are
complex in a context of severe escalating intergroup conflict. There are competing
influences. Hope for improvement for one's group was linked to stronger identification,
which in turn was linked to more hopelessness for one's own future. Yet the direct impact
ofhope for improvement for one's group was less hopelessness for one's own future.
Other competing processes were observed for social identification in Study 3. Social




'The SEM analysis in Figure 1 was conducted across all religious groups. An
additional SEM analysis was conducted using the same model as in Figure 1 after
controlling for participants' religious group affiliation by using within-group
standardization (i.e., z-scores) prior to submitting the data to SEM. This approach was
taken given the small sample size for a number of the religious groups, which excluded
conducting a multi-group SEM analysis. The results provided an excellent fit to the data
(?2(?) = 14.43,;? - .41, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .01, CI - .00 -.04, SRMR = .03, and yjldf
= 1.02). All the same paths were significant, with the exception that perceptions of group
status and individual status no longer predicted social identification.
The discrepancy for the path from individual status to social identification can be
understood in terms of religious group differences. In the model results in Figure 1, the
significant path (ß = -.10, ? = 2.42,? < .05) from perceived individual status to social
identification corresponds to a significant zero-order correlation between these two
variables (r = -.09,? < .05; see Table 1). This correlation likely reflects the religious
group differences in individual status ratings and in social identification, with the groups
showing the highest mean individual status ratings also showing the lowest identification
ratings (r = -.64 between the respective group rankings for the 7 largest groups). Thus,
controlling for religious group differences attenuates or annuls the -.09 correlation. In
contrast, the discrepancy in results for perceptions of group status cannot be accounted
for in a similar manner. First, the zero-order correlation between perceived group status
and social identity is not significant (r = .07), yet the corresponding partial correlation is
significant (r = . 1 1 ,p < .05) when controlling for the covariâtes ofperceived group status
in Figure 1 . There is thus a suppressor effect. The latter effect is not apparent in the
standardized data, however, with both the zero-order and partial correlations being
nonsignificant (rs = .05 and .08, respectively, ps > .05).
2We conducted a multi-group SEM analysis to test the equivalence of individual
parameters across 2 models that were identical to that reported in Figure 1. The first,
base, model was for participants who completed the questionnaires in English (n = 398),
whereas the second model was for participants who completed the questionnaires in
Arabic (n = 168). The analysis revealed a well-fitting multi-group model indicating
general equivalence in the individual parameters across both models (?2 (37) = 43.14, ? =
.23, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .02, CI = .00 - .05, SRMR = .06, and x2/df= 1.17). All the
same paths were significant in both models (that matched Figure 1), except that the direct
path leading from perceived individual status to social identity was nonsignificant for
each language group.
3One might argue that the evaluative aspect of social identification (e.g., "I feel
good about my Ta'ifa") may account for the relation between social identification and
hopelessness. To address this argument, an additional SEM analysis was conducted after
excluding the 3 evaluative items from the social identification measure (the identification
scale still exhibited high reliability: a = .82). The model provided a good fit to the data
(?2 (14) = 22.54, ? = .07, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .03, CI = .00 - .06, SRMR = .03, and
yjldf= 1.61). As such, group self-esteem does not underlie the model results.
4The findings also indicated that perceptions of instability, illegitimacy, and
impermeability all increased feelings ofhopelessness for one's future through social
identification and involvement in collective action (all ßs < .02, all zs >2.2S,p < .05).
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Prior research suggests that members of low status groups who identify with their groups
experience more negative affect and depressed emotion if they perceive discrimination
against their group (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003; Yoo & Lee, 2008). This relation was
addressed in terms ofperceived illegitimacy (e.g., "Members ofmy Tai'fa are unjustly
kept out ofhigher social and political positions by other Tawa 'if). A hierarchical linear
regression was conducted to examine whether individuals who identify with their groups
and perceive group status differences as illegitimate experience more hopelessness for
their own futures. In Step 1, all variables in the model (see Figure 1) were entered into
the regression analysis as control variables. In Step 2, a 2-way interaction term between
social identity and perceived illegitimacy was entered into the regression analysis. The
results indicated that the 2-way interaction between social identity and perceived
illegitimacy in Step 2 did not significantly account for more variance in individual
hopelessness (Step 1 : R2 = .22, F (7, 558) = 21 .86,/? < .001 ; Step 2: Change= .01, F(I,
557) = 2.93, ? > .05; ß = -.07, ? > .05). As such, perceived illegitimacy does not
contribute to hopelessness, beyond its impact on social identification and collective
action.
5The reported SEM analysis was conducted across all groups. An additional SEM
analysis was conducted after controlling for participants' religious group affiliation using
within-group standardization (i.e., z-scores). The results of the same model provided an
excellent fit to the data (?2 (6) = 4Al, ? = .62, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .00, CI = .00 - .07,
SRMR = .03, and X2/df= .74). All paths were significant, with the exception that the path
leading from social identification to depression was a trend (ß = -.09, z = -l.$l,p = .07).
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6For language, we standardized within English (n = 1 92) and Arabic (n = 86)
questionnaires, since the sample size was too small in the latter group to conduct a multi-
group SEM analysis. The results of the same model (as in Figure 2) provided an excellent
fit to the data (?2 (6) = 6.54, ? = .37, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .02, CI = .00 - .08, SRMR = .04,
and x2/df= 1 .09). All paths were significant.
7As in footnote 3 for Study 2, an additional SEM analysis was conducted after
excluding the group self-esteem component of social identification. The resultant
identification scale exhibited high reliability (a = .83). The model provided an excellent
fit to the data (?2 (6) = 5.87, ? = .44, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .00, CI = .00 - .08, SRMR = .03,
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Descriptive statistics, internal consistency coefficients, and correlations between scales
in Study 3
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 . Instability —
2. Group status .29*** —
3. Individual status .06 .24*** —
4. Social identity .29*** .17** -.01 —
5. Hopelessness ..44*** -.14* -.25*** .04 —
6. Depression -.37*** -.30*** -.07 -.18** .43*** —
M 3.86 6.01 5.96 4.52 3.44 0
SD 1.14 2.14 1.62 1.26 1.46 1
Cronbach'sa .74 — — .85 .74 .87A78
Note. Depression scores were standardized. See text for CES-D and BDI-II descriptive statistics. Internal
consistency coefficients are for the CES-D and BDI-II respectively.
N = 278.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Appendix A
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:











































To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
1 . No matter what effort an individual from one Ta 'ifa makes, he or she can never truly


































To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:































































Think of this 10-step ladder as representing where the different Tawa'if stand in
Lebanon. At the top of the ladder are the Tawa ?/that are the best off: those that have the
most money, that have the most respected jobs, and the most political power. At the
bottom of the ladder are the Tawa 'if that are the worst off: those that have the least
money, that have the least respected jobs, and the least political power.
Please place an X on the step that best represents where you think your Ta'ifa now
stands on the ladder.
THE TOP OF THE LADDER
THE BOTTOM OF THE LADDER
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Appendix E
Think of this 10-step ladder as representing where people stand in Lebanon. At the top of
the ladder are the people who are the best off: those who have the most money, who are
the most educated, and who have the most respected jobs. At the bottom of the ladder are
the people who are the worst off: those who have the least money, who are the least
educated, and who have the least respected jobs.
Please place an X on the step that best represents where you think you now stand on the
ladder.
THE TOP OF THE LADDER
THE BOTTOM OF THE LADDER
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Appendix F
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:





























































































Please indicate the extent to which you are involved in the following behaviors:
1 . I participate in public demonstrations that aim to support the political power of my
Ta 'ifa.
1
Notatali A little bit Somewhat Quite a bit | Very much | Extremely
2. 1 participate in student rallies to further the political goals ofmy Ta 'ifa.
1
Not at all A little bit Somewhat Quite a bit | Very much | Extremely
3. 1 participate in group meetings that aim to support the economic and political goals of
my Ta 'ifa.
1
Not at all A little bit Somewhat Quite a bit Very much Extremely
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Appendix H
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:




















3. When I think ofmy own life, I look forward to the future with hope and enthusiasm.
1
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
